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Tension between the “Islamic world” and the (non-Islamic) 
“Western world” has increased over the last few years, 
partly due to the impact of terrorist attacks (Bar-Tal and 
Labin 1998; Doosje, Kateman, and Mathyi, forthcoming; 
Pettigrew 2003; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004). In 
three studies, we examine how attributions of responsibil-
ity for terrorist attacks may depend on group membership 
(studies 1 to 3: perpetrator vs. victim group membership), 
perceived typicality of the perpetrator (studies 1 and 3), and 
level of identification with either the victim (study 1) or 
victim or perpetrator ingroup (studies 2 and 3). In studies 1 
to 3, we examine these attributions in relation to attacks 
perpetrated by Islamic people. In addition, study 3 also 
explores how attributions are made in relation to attacks 
committed by non-Islamic people.
Our most basic argument is that people’s attributions of 
responsibility for terrorist attacks depend on their group 
membership. Specifically, we propose that the typical in-
tergroup attribution bias will be observed in this context, 
in which members of the perpetrator group will attribute 
less responsibility to their own group than members of 
the victimized group do. We extend this work in two 
ways: by investigating the role of victim identification 
(study 1) and victim or perpetrator group identification 
(studies 2 and 3), and the role of perceived typicality of 
the perpetrator for the group as a whole (studies 1 and 3). 
In the case of Islamic terrorists, we expect the victimized 
group (i.e., non-Islamic respondents) to make stronger 
attributions to the Islamic world to the extent that they 
feel a bond with the victim (study 1) or the victimized 
ingroup (studies 2 and 3), and have stronger perceptions 
of the perpetrators as typical Islamic group members. In 
contrast, we propose the hypothesis that members of the 
perpetrator group (i.e., Islamic participants) will perceive 
the Islamic perpetrators of terrorist attacks as “black 
sheep,” and focus on the responsibility of the non-Islamic 
world for creating tension between the groups.
Three studies examine how people’s attributions of responsibility for terrorist attacks depend on their group membership and their identification with the 
victim (study 1) or their identification with the victim’s or perpetrator’s ingroup (studies 2 and 3). We observe that people’s group membership (perpetrator 
group versus victim group) determines the judgments of responsibility for recent terrorist attacks. Members of the perpetrator group hold the direct perpetra-
tors responsible, while members of the victim group perceive the perpetrator world as a whole as relatively responsible as well. Identification with the victim 
(study 1) or victim group (studies 2 and 3) strengthens attributions of responsibility to the whole perpetrator group, and this relationship is partially mediated 
by the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the whole group. We discuss possible explanations for this pattern, and indicate the implications of these 
results in terms of improving intergroup relations. 
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1. Social Identity Theory and Beyond
People have a general motivation to display a favorable at-
titude towards the ingroup in comparison to relevant out-
groups. Throughout the history of humankind, people have 
been favorably predisposed towards their own group (Mc-
Neill and McNeill 2003). Some people explain this general 
ingroup-bias in terms of evolutionary origins, while others 
stress the importance of a positive social self-image – e.g., 
Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory (1986) or a need to 
reduce uncertainty about one’s position in the world.
We argue that other motivations may have arisen from this 
general tendency. One such motivation is coined the “inter-
group attribution bias” (Hewstone 1990; Maass 1999; Maass, 
Ceccarelli, and Rudin 1996; Pettigrew 1979). According to 
this theory, people are likely to explain positive ingroup 
behavior in terms of own qualities (rather than pure luck or 
other external factors), while the same positive behavior by 
an outgroup is perceived as less internally controlled. With 
respect to negative group behavior, the reverse pattern has 
been observed (Hewstone 1990; also Maass 1999). In other 
words, people tend to perceive their own group as bet-
ter than outgroups, and to make internal attributions for 
positive ingroup behavior and negative outgroup behavior, 
while making external attributions for unfavorable ingroup 
behavior and favorable outgroup behavior. Furthermore, 
Doosje and Branscombe (2003) have shown than this typ-
ical intergroup attribution effect becomes stronger when 
identification with one’s own group increases. Ingroup 
identification or attachment can be defined as the cognitive, 
affective, and emotional ties between an individual and the 
ingroup. Doosje and Branscombe showed that people are 
more likely to attribute negative ingroup behavior exter-
nally and negative outgroup behavior internally when they 
identify strongly with their ingroup (see also Doosje et al. 
1998). Similarly, Pennekamp et al. (2007) show how mem-
bers of disadvantaged groups make stronger attributions 
of responsibility to the perpetrator outgroup for previous 
misdeeds as ingroup identification (and the associated 
relevance of the subject for people) increases.
When we apply these ideas to our context of terrorism and 
increased tension between the Islamic and non-Islamic 
worlds, this leads to a general prediction that non-Islamic 
respondents will attribute more responsibility for the ter-
rorist attacks and increased intergroup tension to Islamic 
people as a whole than do Islamic participants. Islamic 
respondents are more likely than non-Islamic participants 
to perceive non-Islamic people as responsible for increased 
tension. In line with this hypothesis, we found the follow-
ing comment by a non-Islamic person on the internet: 
“Are the Muslims done yet? I’m so sick of turning on the 
news or hearing on the radio about them protesting this or 
rioting over that… . I mean come on … get a life! All these 
people do is fight and hate!” (posted on www.SFGate.com, 
accessed February 15, 2006).
In addition, we predict this intergroup attribution bias 
will be stronger for people who identify highly with their 
group. Specifically, when explaining negative behavior 
by an Islamic person, non-Islamic participants are more 
likely to attribute the behavior to the Islamic outgroup as 
a whole, the more strongly they themselves identify with 
their own group. Islamic respondents are more likely to 
attribute negative ingroup behavior externally the more 
strongly they themselves identify with their own group. 
Thus, we predict that when Islamic people feel a strong 
bond with their own group, they are more likely to point 
to the role of the non-Islamic outgroup in causing the 
harm done by Islamic people.
2. The Black Sheep Effect
The second motivation in intergroup contexts that is highly 
relevant in our research is the “black sheep effect” (Abrams 
et al. 2002; Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1998). According 
to this idea, negative ingroup members are perceived as 
atypical or, in other words, as black sheep by other ingroup 
members. Research has shown that people judge ingroup 
deviants more harshly than outgroup deviants. One way to 
explain these tendencies is that people want to maintain a 
positive image of their ingroup. By excluding antinorma-
tive deviants from their group, the image of the group as a 
whole stays intact. This black sheep effect has been demon-
strated in a wide range of studies, in different contexts, us-
ing different sorts of samples (Abrams et al. 2000; Abrams, 
Rutland, and Cameron 2003; Marques and Yzerbyt 1988; 
Marques et al. 1998). In addition, it has been shown that the 
black sheep effect is stronger when identification is rela-
tively high (Abrams et al. 2003; Branscombe et al. 1993).
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In our context, we expect Islamic participants to perceive 
Islamic perpetrators as less typical of the Islamic group 
than non-Islamic people do. We found the following quote 
by an Islamic person posted on www.mkuk.wordpress.
com (accessed February 15, 2006), nicely illustrating our 
basic hypothesis:  
 
“I felt that I had to explain that the embassy burning and 
flag burning were in no way representative of Muslims as 
a whole or Islam. Islam forbids these kinds of acts… . As 
Muslims we now have a huge responsibility to portray 
Islam in its true form, by this I mean we need to show that 
the Islam as portrayed by the extremist fringe and certain 
media outlets is an abnormality, not the norm.”  
 
Thus, this Islamic person aims to portray the perpetrators 
as black sheep and atypical of their group.
In addition, we predict that high identification results in 
more extreme judgments, leading to higher black sheep 
scores for Islamic respondents (i.e., perceiving Islamic per-
petrators as atypical ingroup members), and higher “white 
sheep” scores for non-Islamic participants (i.e., perceiving 
Islamic perpetrators as typical outgroup members). This 
latter prediction can also be derived from work on outgroup 
variability perceptions as a function of level of ingroup 
identification (Doosje and Branscombe 2003; Doosje, El-
lemers, and Spears 1995; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997). 
Here we show that people with strong ingroup identification 
have a homogeneous perception of the outgroup. Thus, non-
Islamic people are likely to perceive Islamic terrorists as 
typical, in order to maintain a homogeneous and coherent 
perception of the outgroup, and they are expected to do this 
more strongly when they identify strongly with their group.
3. Study 1 
In this study, we investigated the immediate reactions to a 
terrorist attack in the Netherlands, in which the nationally 
famous Dutch film maker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh 
was murdered by an Islamic terrorist (Mohammed B.). We 
expected a stronger tendency for Islamic people than for 
non-Islamic people to create an image of this perpetrator 
as a black sheep. In addition, we expected Islamic people 
to attribute less responsibility to the Islamic group as a 
whole than non-Islamic people do (i.e., the general attribu-
tion bias). Moreover, we expected these patterns to emerge 
more strongly, the more strongly non-Islamic people 
identified with the victim. Although identification with 
the victim is not the same as identification with a group, it 
is possible to predict that high identification with a victim 
may lead people to be better able to take the victim’s per-
spective, and as such make stronger internal attributions 
to the perpetrator and his Islamic ingroup, while attribut-
ing less responsibility to the victim. Finally, we expect that 
the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for his ingroup 
will mediate the path from victim identification to attribu-
tions of responsibility to the Islamic world among non-Is-
lamicrespondents. 
3.1. Method 
Participants 
Our participants were forty-nine males and thirty-one 
females recruited in Amsterdam. Three to six days after 
the nationally famous Dutch filmmaker and critic Theo 
van Gogh was shot and murdered on November 2, 2004, 
we recruited  seventy-one participants at the university 
and nine at the crime scene. The mean age of participants 
was twenty-seven. On the basis of religion, participants 
could be divided into four groups: thirteen were Muslim, 
sixteen were Christian, ten stated another (unspecified) 
religion, and forty-one participants were not religious.
Design
We created one between-participants variable: group 
membership. The thirteen Islamic respondents formed 
one group and all the other people were included in a 
second, non-Islamic group (n=67). We treated identifica-
tion with the victim as a continuous independent vari-
able. As dependent variables we assessed attributions of 
responsibility for the terrorist attack on Theo van Gogh 
(five items: perpetrator, surrounding group of perpetrator, 
Islamic world, victim, Western world) as well as judg-
ments of the typicality of the perpetrator for his group.
Procedure and Dependent Variables
Potential participants were requested to take part in a 
study about the “recent shooting of Theo van Gogh.” Those 
who agreed to participate were given a questionnaire that 
started off with a set of questions about participants’ attri-
butions of responsibility for the deadly attack on Theo van 
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Gogh. People were asked to indicate to what extent they 
considered (a) the perpetrators, (b) the surrounding group 
(e.g., friends and family) of the perpetrator, (c) the Islamic 
world as a whole, (d) the victim himself, and (e) the West-
ern world as a whole responsible. Perceived typicality of 
perpetrator was assessed by a question about the extent to 
which they perceived the perpetrator as a typical Muslim. 
One question measured the extent of identification with 
the victim: “How much did you feel connected with Theo 
van Gogh before his death?” Participants rated all ques-
tions on four-point scales (“not at all,” “a little,” “much,” 
and “very much.” The questionnaire ended with questions 
about age, gender, and nationality.
3.2. Results and Discussion
First, we performed a general linear model (GLM) mixed 
design analysis of variance with five levels (perpetrator, 
surrounding group of perpetrator, Islamic world, victim, 
and Western world), with group membership (Islamic 
and non-Islamic) and identification with the victim 
(continuous) as independent variables and attribution of 
responsibility as a within-subject variable. Due to large 
cell differences in sample size, we used the type I sum of 
squares, which takes into account differences in cell sizes, 
and thus is advised by Tabachnik and Fidell (2001, 296–97; 
see also Zebel et al. 2007; it is important to note that the 
results presented below do not differ substantially if we 
use the standard type III sum of squares). We observed a 
significant main effect of target of responsibility, F (4, 73) 
= 108.88, p ’ .0005, eta squared = η2 = .86. In line with the 
predictions, there was a significant interaction between 
target and group membership, F (4, 73) = 9.66, p’ .0005, 
η2 = .35. In addition, there was a significant interaction 
between target and identification with the victim, 
F (4, 73) = 3.34, p ’ .014, η2 = .16, as well as the hypothesized 
significant three-way interaction between target, group 
membership, and identification with the victim, F (4, 73) 
= 3.46, p ’ .012, η2 = .16.
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, sample sizes (n), and beta values between variable and victim identification for study 1, and ingroup identification 
for studies 2 and 3, for Islamic and non-Islamic people. 
Islamic People Non-Islamic People
M SD n B M SD n B
Study 1
 Attribution perpetrator #
 Attribution friends/family
 Attribution victim #
 Attribution Islamic world #
 Attribution non-Islamic world
 Typicality perpetrator #
3.51a
2.36b
2.82b
1.55c
1.73c
1.15
0.65
0.94
0.55
0.75
0.43
0.55
13
13
13
13
13
13
– .38
.48
– .41
.03
– .10
– .12
3.75a
2.22b
1.80c
2.30b
1.55d
1.91
0.42
1.05
0.73
0.92
0.79
1.10
67
67
67
67
67
67
– .03
.18
– .01
.52*
.07
.50*
Study 2
 Attribution perpetrator
 Attribution al Qaeda #
 Attribution Islamic world #
 Attribution non-Islamic world #
4.18a
2.66c
1.77d
3.45b
1.03
0.94
0.84
0.79
62
62
62
62
.20
– .12
– .50*
– .01
3.84b
4.36a
3.07c
2.64d
1.11
0.63
0.84
0.81
74
74
74
74
.24
.48*
.79*
– .21
Study 3: Islamic perpetrator condition
 Attribution Islamic world
 Attribution non-Islamic world #
 Typicality perpetrator #
1.90a
3.75b
2.17
2.00
2.31
1.18
20
20
20
–1.05*
– .68
– .42
2.94a
3.26a
3.04
1.83
1.46
1.61
34
34
34
.77*
– .27
.43*
Study 3: Non-Islamic perpetrator condition
 Attribution Islamic world
 Attribution non-Islamic world #
 Typicality perpetrator #
3.13b
3.96a
3.10
2.01
2.03
1.79
24
24
24
.24
.19
– .02
3.93a
3.17b
2.26
1.85
1.80
1.20
29
29
29
– .07
.33
.03
# Islamic and non-Islamic people differ on this variable (p' .05).
* B-values p' .05; within columns, attributions of responsibility with different subscripts within each study differ from each other (p' .05).
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The means corresponding to the two-way interaction 
between target and group membership are summarized 
in table 1. In addition, in this table, we present all the re-
lationships (i.e., betas) between level of identification with 
the victim and the five types of attributions of responsi-
bility, for the Islamic and non-Islamic respondent group 
separately, corresponding to the significant three-way in-
teraction. We performed specific contrast analyses (within 
the full design) to test for differences between Islamic and 
non-Islamic people and for differences between the differ-
ent types of attributions within each respondent group.1
 
Inspecting the means first, it can be seen that non-Islamic 
participants attributed more responsibility to the perpe-
trators than did Islamic respondents. Unexpectedly, we 
did not find an effect of group membership on attribu-
tions of responsibility to the direct surrounding group of 
the perpetrator (family/friends). In line with the expected 
general intergroup attribution bias, Islamic participants 
attributed less responsibility to the Islamic world as a 
whole than did non-Islamic respondents. In line with the 
prediction, Islamic participants attributed more responsi-
bility to the victim himself than did non-Islamic respon-
dents. However, unexpectedly, there was no significant 
effect of group membership on the attribution of respon-
sibility to the Western world, even though the means were 
in the predicted direction.
When we consider the relationships (beta values) between 
identification with the victim and attribution of responsi-
bility separately for Islamic and non-Islamic respondents 
(see table 1), it should be noted first that the number of 
Islamic participants (thirteen) was too small for a reliable 
estimate of the relationships. However, the relationships 
for non-Islamic respondents were based on a sample size 
of sixty-seven, and were thus reliable. In this group, iden-
tification with the victim was positively related to attribu-
tions of responsibility to the Islamic world as a whole. This 
indicates that when people felt a bond with 
the victim, they placed more blame on the group to which 
the perpetrator belongs.
A GLM analysis on the perceived typicality of the perpetra-
tor showed the predicted main effect of group membership, 
F (1, 76) = 6.38, p = .014, η2 = .08. Non-Islamic respondents 
(M =1.91: SD =1.10) perceived the perpetrator as more 
typical of the Islamic group than did Islamic participants 
(M = 1.15; SD = 0.55). In addition, the interaction between 
group membership and identification with the victim 
showed a trend, F (1, 76) = 3.08, p = .083, η2 = .04. In line 
with the predictions, there was a positive and significant 
relationship between victim identification and perceived 
typicality in the non-Islamic sample, while this relation-
ship was slightly negative (albeit non-significant) for 
Islamic participants.
 
To test the prediction that typicality of perpetrator would 
mediate the effect of victim identification on attributions 
of responsibility, we conducted regression analyses in the 
non-Islamic sample: identification predicted attributions 
of responsibility to the Islamic world (b=.52, p’.0005) and 
identification predicted perceived typicality (b=.50, p=.002). 
In the final analysis, we included both identification and 
perceived typicality as predictors of attributions (R²=.37, 
F (2, 64) = 18.93, p’.0005). Perceived typicality predicted at-
tributions (b=.36, p’.0005), and the path from identification 
attributions remained significant (b=.35, p=.006). How-
ever, this latter path dropped in strength, resulting in a 
significant Sobel test for mediation, (z=2.90, p=.004). Thus, 
attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world were 
predicted by typicality, but the direct path from identifica-
tion with the victim remained significant as well, indicat-
ing not a full, but partial mediation of perceived typicality. 
Finally, in order to provide a further test of the notion that 
perceived typicality is related to a homogeneous perception 
of the outgroup, we created a difference score between at-
tributions to the perpetrator and the Islamic world (a high 
score denotes a bigger difference, thus a stronger attribu-
tion to the perpetrator than to the Islamic world). In the 
non-Islamic sample, we observed a substantial negative 
correlation between this variable and perceived typicality 
(r=-.50, p’.0005). 
1 Considerations of space led us to restrict the
methodical information provided. The authors
would be pleased to provide further information
on statistical details.
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4. Study 2
In study 1, we observed that people are more likely to gen-
eralize the negative behavior of one outgroup member to 
the outgroup as a whole (and as such implicitly explain the 
behavior as typical of that group) than to generalize the 
negative behavior of one ingroup member to the ingroup 
as a whole. In addition, results showed that members of a 
victim group perceived the perpetrator as more typical of 
his group than did the perpetrator group. Finally, the level 
of identification with the victim intensified the observed 
patterns: non-Islamic people perceived the perpetrator 
as more typical of Islamic people, and attributed more 
responsibility to the Islamic group as a whole when level 
of their identification with the victim was greater. Regres-
sion analyses and a significant Sobel test revealed partial 
mediation: the link between identification and attributions 
to the outgroup as a whole can be partly explained by the 
perceived typicality of the perpetrator.
It is important to note that in this study we focused on 
identification with the victim. The limitation of this 
measure is that it was a single item, and it was a retrospec-
tive item. In the second and the third study, however, we 
administered a multi-item measure of level of identifica-
tion with the respondent’s own group. For reasons both 
theoretical (Smith 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1986) and em-
pirical (Doosje et al. 1998, 2006; Gordijn et al. 2006; Johns, 
Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 
2000; Pennekamp et al. 2007) we hypothesize that identi-
fication with one’s own group is likely to codetermine re-
actions to (harmful) behavior by members of one’s group.
As in study 1, we proposed that non-Islamic people were 
more likely than Islamic people to attribute responsibil-
ity for the occurrence of Islamic terrorist attacks and 
increased intergroup tension to the Islamic group. In ad-
dition, we expect these different judgments to be related to 
level of ingroup identification, such that the more people 
identify with their group, the more likely it is that they 
display this intergroup attribution effect. 
In addition, as in study 1, we expected that the groups 
might differ in the extent to which they perceive the 
perpetrators of attacks performed by Islamic people to be 
typical group members. Unfortunately, because we did not 
measure typicality directly, we have to rely on inferences 
here: when attributions of responsibility for the attacks 
to the perpetrators and to the whole Islamic group are 
positively related, we can infer a perceived typicality of the 
perpetrator. This idea is in line with the final findings in 
study 1, where we observed a negative correlation between 
perceived typicality and the difference between attribu-
tions to the perpetrator and the group as whole. Thus, we 
expected stronger relationships between attributions of 
responsibility for the attacks to the perpetrators and the 
whole Islamic group for non-Islamic than for Islamic 
participants.
4.1. Method 
Participants
We included seventy-four non-Islamic participants and 
sixty-three Islamic respondents in this study, of which 
about two-thirds were female. They all lived in Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands, and were approached in mosques and in 
their homes. Most Islamic people were of Turkish or Mo-
roccan origin. The mean age of the non-Islamic sample was 
thirty-four, and of the Muslim sample twenty-five years. 
Design and Procedure 
The design consisted of one between-participants variable, 
group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic), and one 
continuous variable, identification with the ingroup (either 
the Islamic group, or the native Dutch group). The most 
important dependent variables included attributions of 
responsibility for terrorists attacks and for increased ten-
sion between Islamic and Western world. This was done in 
December 2002, after the United States and Britain took 
control of Afghanistan but before they invaded Iraq.
Dependent Variables
All items were answered on five-point scales ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” We first measured 
identification with the ingroup using seven items derived 
from various sources (including Doosje et al. 1995; Leach 
et al. in press; alpha for the sample was .86). For example, 
one item was: “I feel a bond with Islamic people” or “I 
feel a bond with native Dutch.” Another was “I see myself 
as a member of the Islamic people” or “I see myself as a 
member of the native Dutch.” We measured attributions 
of responsibility of the terrorists attacks “such as in the US 
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and in Madrid” using two items that are similar to study 1: 
one is about attribution of responsibility of the perpetra-
tors and one about “al Qaeda” (similar to “surrounding 
group of perpetrator” in study 1). For attributions to the 
“Islamic world,” we used two questions: “To what extent do 
you perceive the Islamic world as responsible for the ter-
rorist attacks” and the same question about responsibility 
for the increased tension between the Islamic world and 
the Western world (correlation r=.53, p’.001). The same two 
items were administered for attributions to the “Western 
world,” replacing the italized words in the above questions 
with “Western world” (correlation r=.33, p’.001). Finally, 
we recorded participants’ religion (if any), their nationality, 
and their parents’ nationality.2
4.2. Results and Discussion
We performed a general linear model analysis on the 
attribution of responsibility items for the attacks (four, 
treated as a repeated measure) with group membership 
of participant (Islamic versus non-Islamic) and level of 
ingroup identification as independent variables. In terms 
of hypotheses, there was a strong main effect of target of 
attribution of responsibility, F (3, 130) = 50.41, p ’ .0005, 
η2 = .54, that was qualified by the expected interaction 
between group membership and target of attribution of 
responsibility, F (3, 130) = 55.37, p ’ .0005, η2 = .56. The 
means are depicted in table 1. Islamic and non-Islamic 
participants did not differently attribute responsibility to 
the perpetrators of the attacks. However, as expected, non-
Islamic respondents attributed more responsibility to both 
al Qaeda and the Islamic world than did Islamic partici-
pants, whereas the opposite pattern occurred with attribu-
tions of responsibility to the Western world. Finally, the 
three-way interaction between group membership, attribu-
tion of responsibility, and level of ingroup identification 
was significant as well, F (3, 130) = 4.80, p = .003, η2 = .10. 
In order to disentangle this three-way interaction, we 
examined the relationship (in terms of b-values) between 
level of ingroup identification and each attribution of re-
sponsibility, separately for Islamic and non-Islamic people 
(see table 1). For non-Islamic respondents, as expected, we 
observed positive relationships between level of ingroup 
identification and attributions of responsibility to al Qaeda 
and the Islamic world. For Islamic participants, there was 
the expected significant negative relation between level of 
ingroup identification and attributions of responsibility to 
the Islamic world.
 
In terms of correlations between attributions of responsi-
bility, we observed that for non-Islamic people there was 
a correlation between judgments about the perpetrator 
and about al Qaeda (r=.36, p =.002), whereas this link 
was not significant for Islamic people (r=.06, p=.63). In 
addition, for Islamic people, there was a negative associa-
tion between judgments about the perpetrator and about 
the Islamic world (r=-.33, p =.008), whereas this link was 
not observed for non-Islamic people (r=.06, p=.63). In both 
groups we observed a correlation between judgments about 
al Qaeda and about the Islamic world (for Islamic people 
r=.34, p =.008; for non-Islamic people r=.42, p = .001). 
Thus, for non-Islamic people, there was a link between the 
perpetrator and al Qaeda, and an association between al 
Qaeda and the Islamic world, supporting the notion that 
non-Islamic participants treated the outgroup targets as a 
homogeneous entity. In contrast, for Islamic participants, 
there was no link between the perpetrator and al Qaeda, 
even though they perceived a relation between al Qaeda 
and the Islamic world.
In study 2 we replicated and extended the findings of 
study 1. We observed a general intergroup attribution bias, 
according to which both Islamic and non-Islamic people 
attributed less responsibility for terrorist attacks and 
increased tension to their own group than to the outgroup. 
This tendency was, to some extent, strengthened through 
a high identification with the ingroup. In addition, for 
non-Islamic people, there were significant correlations 
between attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator 
and to al Qaeda, and between al Qaeda and the Islamic 
world. These correlations suggest that non-Islamic people 
2 The nationality of the parents was not part of the 
statistical analysis; this question was merely asked 
to make sure we recruited Dutch people with Dutch 
parents.
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have a coherent perception of the Islamic perpetrators and 
their group. For Islamic people, even though the attribu-
tions to al Qaeda and to the Islamic world were correlated, 
there was no link between attributions to the perpetrator 
and to al Qaeda. Moreover, there was a negative associa-
tion between attributions to the perpetrator and to the 
Islamic world. These patterns are at least suggestive of a 
“black sheep effect”: Islamic people do not want to consider 
perpetrators as real ingroup members. They do not want 
these members to stain the image of their group.
5. Study 3
In the third study, we set out to improve on study 2 in two 
respects: one was to measure perceived typicality of the 
perpetrators again (as we did in study 1). Secondly, so far, 
group membership (Islamic/non-Islamic) has been cor-
related with the perpetrator/victim dimension. In order 
to rule out possible confounding effects, we manipulated 
the perpetrator/victim group role in the third study, while 
still including both Islamic and non-Islamic respondents, 
by focusing on different real-life episodes of intergroup 
behavior. The specific Dutch context after the assassina-
tion of Theo van Gogh (see study 1) provided a situation 
in which both groups attacked each other. During the first 
two weeks after van Gogh’s murder both churches and 
mosques were set on fire. Fortunately, there were no lives 
lost in these attacks, but the climate became very heated 
and confused. In that period of uncertainty, it was pos-
sible to create different images of the two groups, either as 
victim or as perpetrator of intergroup violence (although 
one could argue that an Islamic person instigated all this, 
and that globally speaking, Islamic terrorists receive quite 
a lot of attention, and thus, that our manipulation would 
have had to be stronger than this. We will return to this 
issue in the general discussion).
We aimed to replicate the intergroup attribution bias, and 
predicted again that this bias was stronger for people 
high in ingroup identification. In addition, we expected 
perceptions of typicality of the perpetrators to mediate 
this effect of identification on intergroup attribution bias. 
Specifically, we expected members of perpetrator groups to 
make black sheep of their negative group members, and do 
so more strongly, the more strongly they identify with their 
group. We predicted that members of victimized groups, 
however, would hold a coherent and homogeneous picture 
of the perpetrator group in their head, and thus perceive 
the perpetrators as typical members of the outgroup, and 
do so more strongly the more strongly they identify with 
their ingroup.
5.1. Method
Participants
Twenty-three male and twenty-two female Islamic respon-
dents and thirty-one male and thirty female non-Islamic 
persons (plus five people who did not indicate their gender) 
participated in this study in November 2004. Their mean 
age was twenty-three years for the Islamic sample, and 
twenty-seven for the non-Islamic sample. Their partici-
pation was voluntary and they were informed about the 
purpose of the study afterwards. 
Design and Procedure
The design thus consisted of two between-participants 
variables: perpetrator group membership (non-Islamic 
versus Islamic) and respondent group membership (non-
Islamic versus Islamic), with ingroup identification as a 
continuous independent variable.
Participants were approached in public areas (e.g., trains, 
markets, etc.) and were asked to fill out a short question-
naire concerning the recent tension between Islamic and 
non-Islamic, autochthonous Dutch people. They were first 
asked to indicate their religion: Islamic, Christian, other, 
or no religion. Subsequently, we measured level of ingroup 
identification, using the same nine items as in study 2. 
(reliability coefficient .95). 
Manipulation of Perpetrator or Victim Role of Group
Subsequently, participants were presented with a text de-
scribing a terrorist incident. In the Islamic [non-Islamic] 
perpetrator condition, we gave an account of a terrorist at-
tack on a Protestant church [mosque] in the Netherlands, 
explaining that the terrorists had set the church [mosque] 
on fire and written anti-Christian [anti-Islamic] slogans 
on the building. According to the text, the attack had not 
resulted in fatalities.
Dependent Variables
Attributions of responsibility for the recent tension were 
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measured by two items that we used in study 2 as well: 
“To what extent is Islamic world [Western world] respon-
sible for recent tension between Islamic and non-Islamic 
people?” answered on a seven-point scale ranging from 
“not at all” to “very much”. Perceived typicality of the 
perpetrators was recorded by two items: “I perceive the per-
petrators as prototypical Muslims [autochthonous Dutch]” 
and the measure of inclusion of the perpetrators in the 
perpetrator group (i.e., either Muslim or autochthonous 
Dutch). The latter was measured with seven increasingly 
overlapping circles representing the perpetrators and their 
group, adapted from Tropp and Wright (2001). The cor-
relation between these two items was .36 (p’.0005). 
5.2. Results and Discussion
We used a general linear model (GLM) procedure in 
which we treated attributions of responsibility for the 
attacks to the Islamic world and to the Western world 
as a within-participants variable (labelled “target”), and 
included perpetrator group membership (Islamic versus 
non-Islamic) and respondent group membership (Islamic 
versus non-Islamic) as between-participants variables, 
and ingroup identification as a continuous independent 
variable. We found significant interaction between target, 
perpetrator group membership, and respondent group 
membership, F (1, 99) = 15.82, p ’.0005, η2 = .14, as well as 
a four-way interaction with these variables and ingroup 
identification, F (1, 99) = 8.58, p =.004, η2 = .08. In order to 
disentangle this four-way interaction, we decided to break 
it down by perpetrator group membership, enabling us to 
examine the relationships as a function of making salient 
an Islamic perpetrator group (thereby replicating studies 
1 and 2) versus making salient a non-Islamic perpetra-
tor group. All the relevant means and relationships with 
ingroup identification (b-values) can be found in table 1.
Examining the Islamic perpetrator group condition first, 
a GLM of the attributions of responsibility for the at-
tacks (Islamic world and non-Islamic world) showed the 
expected target by respondent group membership interac-
tion, F (1, 50) = 5.73, p ’.021, η2 = .10, illustrating the classic 
intergroup attribution bias. Similar to Study 1 and 2, this 
interaction was again qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction involving ingroup identification, F (1, 50) = 5.77, 
p ’.020, η2 = .10. There were no other significant effects. 
When we broke down the significant three-way interac-
tion, we found strong support for the predicted pattern 
in that attributing responsibility to the perpetrator group 
(Islamic people) was related negatively with ingroup iden-
tification for Islamic participants, while this relation was 
positive for non-Islamic respondents (all relationships are 
given in table 1). With respect to attribution to the victim-
ized group, there were no significant relations between 
ingroup identification and the attributions. 
Examining the non-Islamic perpetrator group condition, a 
GLM of the attributions of responsibility for the attacks 
(Islamic world and Western world) showed the expected 
target by respondent group membership two-way in-
teraction effect, F (1, 49) = 12.49, p ’.001, η2 = .20. Means 
are given in table 1. In line with the general intergroup 
attribution pattern, non-Islamic respondents ascribed 
somewhat more responsibility to the Islamic world than 
did Islamic respondents, whereas Islamic respondents 
ascribed significantly more responsibility to the Western 
world than did non-Islamic people. There were no other 
significant effects.
We did the same GLM analyses with respect to perceived 
typicality of perpetrators for their ingroup, and found a 
significant two-way interaction between perpetrator group 
membership and respondent group membership, F (1, 101) 
= 4.35, p ’.040, η2 = .04, as well as a trend for the three-way 
interaction with these variables and ingroup identification, 
F (1, 101) = 2.98, p ’.087, η2 = .03. In order to disentangle 
this three-way interaction, we decided to break it down 
again by perpetrator group membership.
Examining the Islamic perpetrator group condition first, a 
GLM of the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the 
group as a whole showed the expected two-way respon-
dent group membership by ingroup identification interac-
tion effect, F (1, 52) = 5.30, p ’.025, η2 = .09. No other signifi-
cant effects emerged. Perceived typicality of the Islamic 
perpetrator was related slightly negatively with ingroup 
identification for Islamic people, although not significantly, 
possibly due to the small sample, while this relationship 
was positive for non-Islamic people (see table 1).
Examining the non-Islamic perpetrator group condition, 
a GLM of the perceived typicality of the perpetrators 
showed no significant effects.
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We hypothesized that when people identify with their 
group, they are more likely to perceive outgroup perpetra-
tors as typical for their group, and consequently attribute 
more responsibility to the outgroup as a whole. We used 
the program EQS to assess this model, separately for the 
Islamic perpetrator group condition and the non-Islamic 
group condition, and, in both cases, separately for Islamic 
and non-Islamic people. Because we specified a full model, 
it was not possible to estimate fit indices. The structural 
equation models for the Islamic perpetrator conditions are 
presented in figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 1: Study 3 Islamic perpetrators: for non-Islamic people
*p < .05    ^p = .08
 
As can be seen in figure 1, non-Islamic people perceived 
Islamic perpetrators as relatively typical to the extent that 
they identified more strongly with their group (“white 
sheep”). These perceptions of typicality in turn led to 
higher attributions of responsibility to Islamic people as 
a whole. In addition, there was a direct and positive path 
from ingroup identification to attributions of responsibility. 
The Sobel test did not meet conventional level of signifi-
cance and showed a trend (p=.10), but this may have been 
caused by small size of the sample and thus larger error.
Importantly, quite a different picture emerged for Islamic 
people (fig. 2), where there was a direct but negative path 
from ingroup identification to attributions of responsibility. 
At the same time, there was a negative relation between 
ingroup identification and perceived typicality of the 
perpetrator for the ingroup. As such, they perceived the 
perpetrators as “Black Sheep.”
Figure 2: Study 3 Islamic perpetrators: for Islamic people
*p < .05 
In the non-Islamic perpetrator group condition, we 
observed a similar ingroup-outgroup pattern, but with 
notable differences. Although the relationship between 
ingroup identification and attributions of responsibility to 
the perpetrator group was, as expected, positive (.23) for 
Islamic participants, but it was not significant, possibly 
due to low cell numbers. Similarly, there was a positive 
and significant path from perceived typicality and attribu-
tions of responsibility to the perpetrator group (.40). These 
two paths were identical to the corresponding paths in the 
Islamic perpetrator group condition. However, in contrast 
to previous findings, in this case, there was no path from 
ingroup identification to perceived typicality (-.02). 
Finally, all paths for the non-Islamic participants in the 
non-Islamic perpetrator group condition were all below .10, 
and thus not significant.
In general, the third study replicated and extended find-
ings from studies 1 and 2, by showing the role of and links 
between group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic), 
ingroup identification, perceived typicality of the per-
petrator in explaining attributions of responsibility to 
the perpetrator group as a whole, when a terrorist attack 
points to the Islamic background of the perpetrators, as 
was the case in the previous two studies. We were also able 
to show that the traditional intergroup attribution bias is 
strengthened when the perpetrators are from one’s own in-
group and thus the image of one’s own group is threatened. 
However, when we make the non-Islamic group the salient 
perpetrator group, we do find the traditional intergroup 
‘White sheep’
.34* (.57*)
.33^ .49*
Identification ingroup
Typicality Perpetrator
Responsibility
Islamic world
‘Black sheep’
– .46* (–.52*)
– .34 .16
Identification ingroup
Typicality Perpetrator
Responsibility
Islamic world
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attribution bias, but find no support for the effects of per-
ceived typicality and ingroup identification in this context. 
We can think of a couple of reasons as to why this might 
be the case. First, we do have to acknowledge the fact that 
in the Netherlands, in the media and daily conversation, 
the role of Islamic perpetrators is much more salient than 
the role of non-Islamic perpetrators. As such, making 
salient the Islamic background of the perpetrators may 
have fitted in with pre-existing ideas about who is the 
perpetrator and who is the victim in this context, whereas 
the opposite manipulation may have been more difficult to 
integrate with pre-existing notions about victim-perpetra-
tor group membership. 
In addition, it may be possible that we observe weaker ef-
fects among Islamic people because they may feel attached 
to the country (the Netherlands), whereas Dutch people 
are less likely to identify with Islamic people. Alternatively, 
it might be possible to explain the differences between 
making salient either the Islamic or non-Islamic perpe-
trator in terms of the differences between the respondent 
groups: Islamic versus non-Islamic people, all living in the 
Netherlands. These groups differ in terms of a number of 
factors, such as group size, economic status, and politi-
cal power. These factors may contribute to caution among 
Islamic people about attributing responsibility to the 
non-Islamic perpetrator. They may want to avoid possible 
negative sanctions for placing too much of the blame on 
the dominant non-Islamic group. From the present set of 
data, we can conclude that we do find similar patterns in 
terms of differences between the groups. However, we do 
not find strong support for the processes underlying the 
attributions of responsibilities in the first two studies 
(in terms of victim or ingroup identification, and per-
ceived typicality), when the perpetrators of a terrorist 
attack are implied to be non-Islamic. 
6. General Discussion
In the three studies we focused on attributions of respon-
sibility to the perpetrator group as a whole for terrorist 
attacks as a function of group membership (Islamic and 
non-Islamic people), level of identification with the victim 
(study 1), or victim/perpetrator group (studies 2 and 3), 
and perceived typicality of the perpetrators for the group. 
Across the three studies, we observe the classic intergroup 
attribution bias when people are requested to indicate 
the responsibility for the terrorist attacks and the result-
ing tension between the Islamic and non-Islamic people. 
More specifically, on average, non-Islamic people perceive 
the Islamic group as a whole as more responsible than do 
Islamic people. Islamic people, on average, attribute more 
responsibility to the Western world than do non-Islamic 
people. This typical pattern of “blaming the other party” 
has been well-documented in other contexts (for reviews 
see Pettigrew 1979; Hewstone 1990), but not in the context 
of international terrorism.
 
In this article we have focused on underlying mechanisms 
of this phenomenon. We argue that ingroup identifica-
tion intensifies the classic attribution bias. In line with 
Doosje and Branscombe (2003), we have observed that 
people display a stronger intergroup attribution bias when 
they identify more strongly with their own group. More 
importantly, in our view, we have shown that perceived 
typicality of the perpetrator for the group as a whole plays 
a partial role in this context. More specifically, we have 
shown that when people identify relatively strongly with 
the victim (study 1) or their ingroup (study 2 and 3), they 
are more likely (study 1) or they tend (study 3) to perceive 
the perpetrator as a typical outgroup member, and thus 
perceive a link between the perpetrator and the group, 
and consequently attribute responsibility to the group as 
a whole for the actions of its member(s). Even though the 
direct path from identification to attribution remained 
significant, perceived typicality of the perpetrator partly 
mediates the relationship between identification and at-
tributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a 
whole. This is the most important lesson from our three 
studies combined.
What can we say about the different opinions that were 
expressed by non-Islamic and Islamic people in the 
introduction? When a non-Islamic person argues that “
all they do is hate and fight,” this is in line with our find-
ing among highly identified members of the non-Islamic 
group: even though we have not included direct measures 
of perceived homogeneity, non-Islamic people tend to 
perceive the Islamic group as a relatively homogeneous 
group to which it is possible to attribute responsibility for 
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the actions of its members. In a similar vein, the person 
who said “I felt that I had to explain that the embassy 
burning and flag burning were in no way representative of 
Muslims as a whole or Islam” is most likely a person who 
identifies quite strongly with the Islamic ingroup, as this 
person tries to portray the perpetrators as “black sheep.”
When taken together, these studies provide a consistent 
picture of how people form attributions of responsibility 
for harmful behavior. Members of victimized groups are 
more likely to perceive the perpetrator(s) as typical of the 
group, and attribute more responsibility to the group. This 
pattern becomes more pronounced as identification with 
the victim or victimized group increases. The psychologi-
cal consequences of these tendencies point to possible 
stronger tensions between the Islamic and the non-Islamic 
world. This may feed back into more negative attitudes to-
wards the outgroup (Doosje, Kateman, and Mathyi forth-
coming), and intergroup relations may further deteriorate. 
In terms of limitations, we need to acknowledge that the 
two groups that we compare in our research are in fact dif-
ficult to compare. For example, it might be argued that the 
non-Islamic category is a broad and ill-defined category, 
while the Islamic category is clearly defined by self-catego-
rization as a Muslim. Similarly, the two groups are likely to 
differ in demographic background, for example level of ed-
ucation and socio-economic status. At the same time, these 
possible differences represent real-life differences, increas-
ing the external validity of results. In addition, we were able 
to replicate most of the basic effects when we manipulated 
the victim-perpetrator role in study 3, lending support to 
the notion that this distinction is important in this context 
of explaining perceptions of intergroup aggression.
Why do people from victim groups make stronger attribu-
tions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a whole? 
Although again we did not include such measures, one 
reason may lie in people’s need for certainty and predict-
ability. For example, research has shown that reminding 
people of terrorist attacks increases their “need for closure” 
(Kruglanski et al. 2006), and that “individuals would like 
to believe in ideas, form impressions and create categories 
in order to feel certain and avoid ambiguity” (Orehek et al., 
forthcoming). More specifically, when American citizens 
watch images of 9/11, they report a higher need for closure 
than do control participants (Orehek et al., forthcoming). 
This shows that people experience uncertainty due to the 
attacks and that they may respond by being motivated to 
draw clear distinctions between good and bad, between 
victim and perpetrator. Creating a homogeneous percep-
tion of the perpetrator group, creates certainty: “They are 
all responsible.”
Conversely, ingroup identification is likely to lead people 
to view the world from their ingroup’s perspective: for 
a real feminist, all men are bad. In this sense, ingroup 
identification may motivate people to perceive the world 
through a strong ingroup-outgroup categorization (Doosje 
et al. 1995; Turner et al. 1987). Perceiving the ingroup and 
the outgroup as homogeneous entities creates these strong 
intergroup boundaries, that make it easy to place any new 
social stimulus in clear categories.
These studies also provide insights into how to deal with 
this issue of generalization of behavior of some members 
to the group as whole. At the most fundamental level, 
ingroup identification plays a crucial role. People’s iden-
tification with their group may fluctuate depending on 
contexts (Ellemers 1993), but it nevertheless constitutes a 
relatively fixed and pervasive entity (Billig, 1995). It may 
be more useful to think about ways to change people’s 
perceptions of typicality of perpetrators. 
One way might be to manipulate the variable of reported 
support for terrorist attacks among the Islamic group, 
in order to test the hypothesis that when (non-Islamic) 
people hear that the Islamic group does not support ter-
rorists attacks, this may lead to lower estimates of typi-
cality of the perpetrator. Another strategy that does not 
directly follow from these studies, but can be derived from 
other work (Doosje et al., forthcoming; Pysczcynski et 
al. 2002) might be to examine the emotional reactions to 
terrorism in terms of fear and anger, and to try to address 
these emotions in order to reduce the negative effects of 
the intergroup violence. A final strategy to reduce the 
perceived typicality of outgroup perpetrators might be 
through taking the perspective of the surrounding out-
group on this issue. That is, if non-Islamic people could 
learn how Islamic people strongly wish to disassociate 
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themselves from terrorists and how they perceive them as 
deviants (e.g., through reading the quote of the Islamic 
person in the introduction for example), this may reduce 
the perceived typicality of the Islamic perpetrators also 
among the perspective takers. However, previous research 
shows that the positive social consequences of perspective-
taking for the outgroup work especially well for people 
who are weakly invested in their group (who are relatively 
flexible in their intergroup perceptions), but not among 
highly identified group members (Zebel, Doosje, and 
Spears, forthcoming). The road to intergroup harmony is 
difficult and uncertain.
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